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Abstract 
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze if the Moroccan state’s efforts to promote Sufism 
have effected the youth perceptions of and engagement with Sufism. The study first 
contextualizes Sufism in Morocco and then addresses why and how the state has reformed the 
religious sphere since the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The King in a 2004 speech announced 
Sufism as of the cornerstones of Moroccan Islam and has since heavily promoted it through 
media, financial support of zawias, and the appointment of Ahmed Toufiq to Minister of Islamic 
Affairs. The state views Sufism as a tolerant, peaceful, and depoliticized way of practicing Islam 
that can counter the growing influence of extremist Salafi and Islamist ideologies. By conducting 
surveys and interviews with a variety of Moroccan youth on Sufism, through the analysis of the 
academic discourse on Sufism in Morocco, and by using the results of a 2010 national survey on 
youth engagement with Sufism the paper provides a picture of how Moroccan youth are engaging 
with Sufism and its influence at the local level. While the state has actively promoted Sufism in 
the public sphere this paper shows Sufism, while viewed positively, is not a critical aspect of 





 Sufism has existed in Morocco for centuries and has played a role in shaping the country’s 
Muslim identity. But globally Sufism faced great criticism with the rise of European colonialism 
and its presence in Morocco decreased. It was not until after the 2003 Casablanca bombings and 
the state’s measures to reform the religious sphere that Sufism would again take on a central role 
in Morocco’s spirituality. Sufism was adopted as an official cornerstone of Moroccan Islam in 
2004 and the state proceeded to promote Sufi values and tariqahs in aim of countering extreme 
religious ideologies. Youth, or those under 30, make up 60% of Morocco’s population and the 
state viewed them as the most vulnerable population to radicalization. Youth, therefore, were the 
primary audience for the state’s program. While there are numerous newspaper articles and even 
a few scholarly journals purporting how Moroccan youth are going Sufi and the effectiveness of 
Moroccan state at countering extremism, there is a clear lack of literature on how Moroccan 
youth actually view Sufism and the state’s promotion of it. My research question, and the basis of 
this paper, consequently is how do Moroccan youth perceive and engage with the Moroccan 
state’s promotion of Sufism? 
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 In this paper I will first outline my own positionality as a researcher and then outline my 
research methods. The next section gives an overview of Sufism, its history, organization as a 
mass movement, and its manifestations in Morocco. I then explain the official view of Islam in 
Morocco, and how its definition changed after the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The steps taken by 
the state to restructure the religious field are clarified. The paper then describes the specifics of 
how and why Sufism is promoted by the state. The next major section addresses my own research 
findings and data from a 2010 national survey on youth and Sufism. These two sources are 
compared and analyzed. Finally I offer a conclusion both about the research itself and why this 
research is significant. 
 
Positionality 
 My identity as an American, female, white, non-Muslim researcher influenced my 
interactions and research capabilities in Morocco. First, as an American and as an outsider I had 
to be aware of people talking about Morocco or Sufism in a way they thought would be most 
pleasing to me. I often also found that I had to ask more detailed questions because people would 
often only give me very general descriptions of Sufism or Islam, on the assumption that as a non-
Muslim and non-Moroccan I did not know anything. Being a female also influenced my research 
in so far as I was not comfortable walking up to young men on my own and asking them to 
complete my survey. I was able to find male perspectives on the topic but only through my 
female contacts introducing me. Finally, my position as an American researching religion meant I 
had to be very aware that Islam is a very sensitive topic in Morocco and being critical of it or the 
state can lead to legal repercussions. To ensure that answering the questions I was asking would 
not threaten the security of any participants, I worked with my advisor Khalid Saqi and my 
Arabic professor Assia to frame the questions in a sensitive manner.  
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Research Methods and Limits 
 My primary research was completed through surveys. The anonymous survey was written 
in Arabic, included five questions, and was given to 11 participants. All the research was done in 
Rabat, Morocco. Seven of the participants were from Dar al-Hadith al-Hassania, a university for 
Islamic studies in Hay Riad. Two masters students at Mohammed V University completed 
surveys. One individual completed a survey at a café in the Ville Nouvelle and finally another 
individual working at a surf shop participated. The ages of participants ranged from 22 to 30. Six 
were female and five male. All those interviewed had at minimum a high school education and 
nine of the eleven were pursuing a master’s degree. I attempted to survey people at both Bab al-
Had and several cafés in the ville nouvelle, however, individuals at these locations would read the 
survey and then return it to me blank explaining they knew nothing about Sufism. These non-
answers were still significant to my research. A copy of the English versions of the survey can be 
found in the appendix.  
 I also completed three interviews, two English and one in Arabic. The first was with Sadik 
Rddad, a professor in the Department of English at Dhar El Mehraz University in Fez. He is an 
expert on Sufism and is also a founding member of the Moroccan Cultural Studies Center. I 
interviewed him both on the history of Sufism in Morocco for background and about Sufism 
specific to the restructuring of the religious sphere. I then interviewed Professor Emilio Spedola 
from Colgate University. He is currently in Morocco researching spiritual security and I spoke 
with him about the concept of spiritual security and how this is related to the restructuring of the 
religious sphere. Finally, I interviewed a female student from Dar al-Hadith, Hanane Mansour, 
about the state’s promotion of Sufism and youth participation in it. A copy of my interview guide 
can be found in the appendix.  
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 Because of the limited scope of my surveys and interviews, it was important to engage 
with literature on the topic as well. Academic literature on my topic was limited but I did have 
access to numerous news articles, which were primarily publicity pieces of the Moroccan regime 
about how the promotion of Sufism effectively counters religious extremism. These were 
nonetheless good background for my research. I also engaged with academic literature about the 
reforms of the religious sphere. The most important resource though the 2010 “Survey on 
Moroccan Youth: Perception and Participation in Sufi Orders” by Khalid Bekkaoui, Ricardo 
René Larémont and Sadik Rddad. This was a national survey that reached a much wider audience 
than my own survey, including both rural and urban areas outside of Rabat. By analyzing their 
data in addition to my own findings, the paper provides findings that are applicable to youth in 
Morocco in general, versus simply the subset of educated, university-aged Rabat youth.  
 Certainly terminology begs definition to clarify the arguments of this paper. The state of 
Morocco is referenced as promoting Sufism not the government of Morocco because these are 
two separate entities in Morocco. The state traditionally in international relations theory is 
sovereign territory with an organized political community that is governed by a single system of 
government. Sociologist and political theorist, Max Weber, defines a state as the entity holding a 
monopoly on the legal use of force within a specific territory. According to these definitions the 
state is Morocco is equal to the King. The King in Morocco is both the commander in chief of 
political and military affairs but he is also the head of all religious affairs. In Morocco, the King 
embodies the state. A government, on the other hand, is administrative body that has decision-
making power within the territory, but it is not immutable. In terms of Morocco, the government 
is the representatives and ministers that make up parliament and the national ministries. Their 
power is not fixed but is dependent on the state, in this case the King allowing the government to 
exist and hold power. Hanane Mansour explained this difference to me and clarified that it is the 
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state, represented by the King, who is promoting Sufism and reforming the religious sphere, not 
the elected government. For the purposes of this paper when addressing Sufism and its 
promotion, I am referring to the actions authorized by the King, first and foremost.  
 Finally, I want to make clear that the scope of my research, even with the academic 
background literature and the 2010 data, is very limited. This paper attempts to draw a few 
specific conclusions about the importance of the promotion of Sufism in the lives of Moroccan 
youth, but in no ways can my research fully represent national trends. There is a great deal left to 
study about how and why the state is promoting Sufism and also what the results have been. Due 
to time constraints, language barriers, and my own positionality, my research is only a starting 
point to delve into the subject. Data analysis is not perfect science and so the conclusions I draw 
are likely not the only ones that can be drawn from my research. The analysis and conclusions are 
influenced by my own worldview, and while I have attempted to offer a holistic picture, this 
research is very much limited.  
Overview of Sufism 
 
History 
Sufism is mysticism within the Islamic framework. Sufism developed as a reform 
movement to what was seen as the materialistic ways of imperial Islam during the Umayyad rule. 
The people who became known as Sufis wanted to return to the purity and simplicity of the 
Prophet’s time and were driven by a “deep devotional love of God that culminated in a quest for a 
direct, personal experience of the presence of God in this life” (Esposito, 2005: 101). The term 
Sufi originally meant ‘one who wears wool’ and it was applied to Muslims whose ascetic 
inclinations led them to wear coarse woolen garments. By the 9th century some representatives of 
these groups of Muslims striving for personal engagement with the Devine adopted tasawwuf as 
the name for their movement (Chittick, 2009). A single definition of Sufism has never been 
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reached but what is agreed upon is that Sufis aim for personal engagement with the Devine and 
focuses on “inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over 
legalism and cultivation of the soul over social interaction” (Chittick, 2009).  
Sufi orders did not come into being until the 12th century CE. Each order, or tariqah in 
Arabic, is based on the relationship between master (sheikh) and disciple and most Sufi orders 
can be linked through pious predecessors all the way back to the Prophet Muhammad (Esposito, 
2005: 105). The sheikh is the spiritual guide who leads disciples through set rituals to achieve 
inner purity and reach a personal experience with God. Sufi congregations include recitation of 
prayers, poems and selections of the Qur’an that are focused on “remembering God” or dhikr. 
Each tariqah has its own special practices as well, which may include meditation, asceticism, 
shire pilgrimages, or chanting.   
While Sufism is not directly addressed in Islamic scripture, the Qur’anic phenomenon of 
ihsan or “doing what is beautiful” is deeply related to Sufi practices. Ihsan is described as a 
deepened understanding that allows you to “worship God as if you see him” that is gained only 
after islam (submission or correct activity) and iman (faith or correct understanding) (Chittick, 
2009). Islam and iman are codified through shari’ah and kalam (theology) while ihsan is 
represented by Sufism. Sufism is therefore not apart from other forms of Islamic teaching but is 
simply another branch.  
Each tariqah has its own religious rites, saintly lineage and leadership structure but four 
general types of tariqahs can be identified. First there are large inclusive traditions which were 
established and organized by a single revered leader but became widespread geographically with 
local or regional sheikhs spreading the practices. An important example of this is the Qadiriyyah, 
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which was established by Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d.1166) in Baghdad but spread across the Arab 
world and North Africa (Voll, 2009). Today a Qadiriyyah branch is one of the most popular Sufi 
orders in Morocco. The second type is orders based on “Ancient Ways” that have less defined 
traditions and structures but are based on affirming the inspiration and instruction by the chain of 
teachers that is traced back to the early Sufis (Voll, 2009). There are also individual-based orders 
that develop due to the innovations of a later teacher. These individuals proclaim a unique 
validity of their practices separate from their ties to earlier tariqahs (Voll, 2009). Finally there are 
shrine tariqahs. These are local orders centered on a particular shrine in which a particular sheikh, 
revered for their piety and often the ability to preform miracles, is buried. The practices of the 
order may spread but the shrine remains an essential center of pilgrimage and prayer (Voll, 2009).  
As Sufism became a mass movement spreading its influence all the way from West Africa 
across to the Indian subcontinent, local traditions not based in Islam became incorporated into 
Sufi practices. As Sufism spread its “healthy concern about legalism and ritual formation gave 
way to the rejection by many of official religious observances and laws…[and it lead to the] 
growth of superstition and fatalism” (Esposito, 2005: 109). Modern Islamic reformers starting in 
the 19th century became incredibly critical of Sufism believing it had led to the decline of the 
Islamic community at the hands of Western imperialism. The Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, who 
came to power in the late 18th century, see Sufism as a deviance from the straight path of Islam. 
They are especially critical of the idea of sheikhs or saints as being intermediaries between man 
and God, because power is attached to God alone and not human beings (Ahmed, 2001: 225). 
Shine and saint worship along with stories of men with miraculous powers discredited Sufism in 
the eyes of the conservative religious establishment and left if open to criticism for being 
unfaithful to the tenets of Islam. But as Akbar S. Ahmed, an Islamic historian and Sufi adept 
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himself, points out the existence of some un-Islamic practices at the local level “does not mean 
that Sufism is to be rejected in its entirety. It is one of the most endearing faces of Islam. Its 
philosophy of universal love, of universal peace, sulh-i-kul is one of the most powerful and 
attractive messages it has for our age” (Ahmed, 2001: 225).  
Sufi Values 
 Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), a famous Andalusian scholar, Sufi, and poet, wrote:  
O Marvel,  
a garden among the flames! 
My heart can take on  
any form:  
a meadow for gazelles,  
a cloister for monks, 
For the idols, sacred ground,  
Ka'ba for the circling pilgrim,  
the tables of the Torah,  
the scrolls of the Qur’an. 
I profess the religion of love;  
wherever its caravan turns along the way,  
that is the belief,  
the faith I keep. 
This poem embodies the spirit of Sufism. It professes to be a tolerant and moderate approach to 
Islam that embraces other religions. Sufi teachings put great emphasis on the need to love God, 
which is not done simply through prayer but through loving all those around you. “For the Sufis 
we are all created out of the same soul. By loving others, you love yourself. God created the 
world out of love” (Rddad, 2015). Ibn Arabi wrote “So show compassion and mercy to the 
servants of God, just as God provides for them in spite of their disbelief and associate of another 
Him in their knowledge of them” (Arabi, 2002: 56). Sufism requires being compassionate even to 
individuals who are not “good Muslims” or who do not believe in God. At the foundation of 
Sufism is the belief that God created all and is embodied in all, to love and gain nearness to Him 
requires loving all creatures that He has created.   
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Sufism in Morocco 
There are three major Sufi orders in Morocco: Tariqah Qadiriyyah, Tariqah Shadhiliyyah, 
and Tariqah Tijaniyyah. The Qadiriyyah has several branches but the major branch in Morocco is 
the Qadiri Boutchichi founded in the late 18th century in Morocco and now led by Sheikh Hamza 
Qadiri al Boutchichi (Rddad). The Shadhiliyyah was first founded in Tunisia in 1228 and holds 
great influence throughout North Africa. It has around 72 different branches globally, which is 
the largest number of offshoots for any tariqah (Rddad). The Darqawiyyah branch is most active 
in Morocco and was founded in the late 18th century (Wikipedia).  
The third prominent Moroccan Sufi order is the Tijaniyyah. This order has no offshoots 
and is unique in its nature. The founded Sidi Ahmed Tijani does not have a spiritual guide like in 
other Sufi orders. Instead he claims the Prophet came to him in a vision and told him he was the 
seal of the saints and must form a new Sufi order. No disciples can become sheikhs in the Tijani 
tradition. Sidi Ahmed is buried in Fez and his shrine is a very important pilgrimage site for 
members of the Tijani order many of whom are from West Africa (Rddad). Renouncing 
affiliation with all other Sufi orders and promising to never join or create another order are 
requisites to becoming a member of the Tijaniyyah, making it impossible for this order to have 
any offshoots.   
Reforming the Religious Sphere 
 
3 Cornerstones of Moroccan Islam 
 Islam in Morocco as defined by the state and existing in public discourse is composed of 
three central tenants: the Maliki School of jurisprudence, the Ash’ari doctrine, and the concept of 
the amir al mu'minin (Commander of the Faithful). The Maliki School is one of the four schools 
of law in Sunni Islam. It was founded by Malik ibn Anas al-Asbahi in the 8th century in the 
Arabian Peninsula. The use of hadiths from companions of the Prophet as a source of law and 
allowing for ray (personal opinion) and qiyas (analogy) in making legal decisions distinguishes it 
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from the other schools of law (Ziadeh). All Moroccan laws are based on rulings based in Maliki 
School.  
 The Ash’ari doctrine is a school of Sunni kalam (theology). It was developed by Abu al-
Hasan ali al-Ash’ari in the 10th century. He was originally a member of the Mu’tazilis (rationalist) 
movement but broke away in 912 CE condemning them as inauthentic. The Ash’ari doctrine 
stresses the use of reason, like the Mu’tazilis, but is more dependent on hadiths. The doctrine 
emphasizes human dependence on God because “God is omnipotent and creates even our acts. 
We appropriate them and thereby become responsible for them” (Leaman). The Ash’ari doctrine 
and Maliki School of thought are important because they allow for human reasoning and do not 
strictly rely on scripture for developing legal and theological understanding (Wainscott). Islam in 
Morocco can therefore be considered more flexible and moderate than some other Arab countries.  
 The third original cornerstone of Moroccan Islam is the position of amir al mu'minin 
always held by the king. The term historically is a claim of legitimacy by the leader of a caliphate 
or sovereign Muslim territory to govern the Muslim community. In Morocco, the position 
combines political and religious power. The Alaouite dynasty, to which the current king belongs, 
began 400 hundred years ago with Moulay Ali Cherif and can trace its lineage back to the 
Prophet (“Morocco’s New King” 1). Each year on Throne Day the position of the King as amir is 
renewed trough the members of the High Council of Islamic Scholars stating their allegiance 
(Toufiq, 2014: 3). The position of amir al mu'minin, by locating the king within a tradition 
tracing back to the Prophet, confers an aura of piety and great legitimacy.  
 
Effects of 2003 Casablanca Bombings 
 On May 16th, 2003 terrorists attacked several Western and Jewish gathering places in 
Casablanca. The death toll was 45 including the 12 suicide bombers. All of the suicide bombers 
were young men from the shantytown of Sidi Moumen on the outskirts of the city. The attacks 
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were perpetrated by the Salafia Jihadia organization that has links to Al-Qaeda (START). Not 
long after the Casablanca attacks, the 2004 Madrid train bombings occurred and the Morocco 
Islamic Combatant Group was blamed. 
 These terrorist attacks fundamentally challenged Morocco’s image as the home of 
moderate and peaceful Islam. King Mohammad VI took swift action in terms of security and 
legal reforms. The parliament passed an anti-terror law directly after the Casablanca attacks that 
gave the government new powers to curb peaceful political activity, censor press, allow a person 
to be detained incommunicado for 12 days, and reduced the requirements for the death penalty 
(A. Maghraoui, 2008). Both the terrorist attacks but also the government’s response challenged 
the progress of democratization in Morocco. The response to the bombings, however, was not 
just focused on increasing security and rounding up those responsible. The background of the 
bombers as poor, undereducated and marginalized young men from shantytowns necessitated 
reforms directed economic development and poverty relief. The National Initiative for Human 
Development was funded in tandem with the World Bank to alleviate rural poverty, social 
exclusion, and alleviate vulnerability to extremist ideologies (World Bank). 
The most significant reforms though came in the restructuring of the religious field. 
Because religion and politics are directly intertwined through the King’s position as the amir al-
mu’minin, the monarchy holds the role of “the ‘guardian’ and ‘protector’ of a particular form of 
Islam that it deems necessary for the ‘balance’ and ‘spiritual security’ of the country and its 
citizens” (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 199). The terrorist attacks proved that ideologies other than the 
state’s “Islam” had become influential within the religious field, and so the state undertook 
reforms to reestablish its own power and make Morocco more secure.  
The restructuring of the religious field was first announced in a speech on April 30th, 2004 
(Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 33). In the speech the King stated, Moroccans must contribute 
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“in a rational and focused way to correct the image of Islam that has been deliberately perverted 
and tarnished by unbalanced villains and the hideous acts of senseless aggressors involved in 
terrorism.” The first steps were to clampdown on illegal mosques and the sale of books or tapes 
associated with Salafi or Wahhabi leaders. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs was given a monopoly 
over the discourse preached in Mosques, the education of imams, the religious broadcasting on 
TV and radio stations, and the issuing of fatwas (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 200). The High Council of 
Religious Scholars – a national High Council, 27 regional councils, and 68 local sections – was 
established in 2004 to “oversee all religious matters in the country and to keep and eye on all 
forms of religious expressions and teachings that detract from the orientation of official Islam” 
(D. Maghraoui, 2009: 202).  
Changes within the media sphere occurred also. The government created the Assadissa 
television and radio stations, which would focus on religious issues and is under the direct 
supervision of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs.  The station airs sermons and religious training 
aimed at promoting tolerant and peaceful Islamic messages (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 204). 
Previously television broadcasters had worn traditional Moroccan clothing but now all preachers 
appear on TV in European style dress (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 204).  
The Council for Moroccans Abroad was also established as an advisory council to the 
expatriate community. It address immigration issues and has its own members on the High 
Council of Religious Scholars (D. Maghraoui, 2009: 205). Morocco had a tarnished international 
reputation after terrorist attacks and plots in Europe and the US were linked to cells originating in 
Morocco. In an attempt to again be considered a peaceful and moderate Islamic country Morocco 
created clear standards for the education of Imams, both male and female, and then opened its 
religious training programs to foreign nationals. The plan was to “send religious preachers that 
are accredited by the Moroccan Ministry of Islamic Affairs to different European countries…In 
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September 2008, 167 imams and 9 mourchidat (female imams) were sent to Europe and Canada” 
(D. Maghraoui, 2009: 206). Restructuring the religious field was essential to Morocco’s 
legitimacy as a peaceful and moderate Muslim country that was an ally to the West in the “War 
on Terror.” 
Sufism as 4th Cornerstone 
 In the King Mohammad VI’s 2004 speech Sunni Sufism was announced as the fourth 
cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. The adoption of Sufism as an official part of Moroccan Islam 
and the state’s subsequent promotion of Sufi values was part of the policy of restructuring the 
religious field to counter the growth of political Islam and to dissociate itself from Salafism 
(Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 34). Sufism was seen as an alternative to the rigidity of radical 
forms of religious interpretations and instead in line with the tolerant message of Islam (D. 
Maghraoui, 2009: 206). The Sufi focus on love is what makes it a valuable tool for the 
government in fighting extremism. Love in Sufism is “not just of your Muslim brotherhood, but 
love of every single creature in the world” (Rddad, 2015). Sufis believe that Jihad should be 
launched against oneself, not others. The purpose of jihad is to strike your evil soul not discipline 
outside enemies (Rddad, 2015). Sufism promotes interfaith dialogue and transnationalism. The 
idea behind promoting Sufism is to spread the message of showing tolerance towards those of 
other religions.  
 The Moroccan state also promotes Sufism because it sees it as de-politicized. Islamist 
parties, especially the Party of Justice and Development, which now leads parliament, pose a 
challenge to both the King’s power and his religious legitimacy (Muedini, 2012: 219). Promoting 
Sufism therefore is used by the Moroccan state to influence “individuals to practice a religion that 
does not emphasize becoming involved in the political system” (Muedini, 2012: 219). Dr. Abbas 
Boughanem said, “Because Sufis are generally not interested in politics and are totally involved 
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in their rituals, they can teach people who follow them some kind of political passivity” (Al-
Ashraf, 2010). Just as the state supported Islamists in the 1970’s to counter leftist trends and 
Salafi movements to fight opposition from the Justice and Charity Party, the state is now using 
Sufism to combat Jihadi movements but also stall the growth of support for Islamist parties like 
the Party of Justice and Development and the Movement for Unity and Reform (Al-Ashraf, 
2010). Sufis also show there is no contradiction between being religious and pledging allegiance 
to the state by practicing religious rituals while engaging in no political opposition (Al-Ashraf). 
Not all Sufi groups, however, are divorced from political involvement. The Justice and Charity 
Party, an Islamist party founded by a Sufi adept, is actively suppressed by the Moroccan state 
because it rejects the legitimacy of the King to be both the head of state and the amir al-mu’minin 
(A. Maghraoui, 2008). The state must be careful making the assumption that Sufism is inherently 
depoliticized.  
 In restructuring the religious sphere the King took a new approach to diplomacy by 
connecting with other countries, especially West African nations, through shared religious 
histories. The adoption of Sufism as a cornerstone of Moroccan Islam was important to these new 
efforts because large populations in West Africa participate Sufi tariqahs that originally 
developed in Morocco. The Tijaniyyah tariqah is especially important because each year 
thousands of people visit Sidi Ahmed Tijani’s tomb in Fez after making pilgrimage to Mecca 
(Rddad, 2015). Sufism is especially important to Moroccan-Senegalese relations since to run for 
president in Senegal one must be endorsed by both major Sufi orders – the Tijaniyyah and 
Muridiyya (Rddad, 2015). Outside of Morocco Sufi tariqahs hold both spiritual and political 
significance. By emphasizing Morocco’s Sufi history, the state has created new diplomatic 
relations. 
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 The state has several methods of promoting Sufism but perhaps the most important step 
after adopting Sufism as a cornerstone of Islam was appointing Ahmed Toufiq to Minister of 
Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs. Ahmed Toufiq is a Sufi adept of the Qadiriyyah 
Boutchichia. He was a professor of history at Mohammad V University, director of the National 
Library, and a writer before becoming a Minister in 2002 (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). 
Toufiq said in a speech to the UN that promoting Sufism is a “method to raise awareness of the 
sanctity of the Other; it curbs unhealthy enthusiasm for racial and tribal belonging and sets up 
institutions that provide assistance, protection, education, and development” (Toufiq, 2012: 5). 
His appointment as Minister solidified the state’s relation to Sufism but more specifically to the 
Qadiriyyah Boutchichia tariqah.  
 In addition to Toufiq’s role as Minister, the state has been investing money in to zawias 
across Morocco. One organization heavily involved in both refurbishing zawias and holding 
public gatherings to introduce Moroccans to Sufism is the Munya Association for the 
Preservation and Revitalization of Moroccan Heritage located in Marrakech (Feuer, 2015). With 
the help of state funding, it hosts music festivals, art classes, and seminars infused with the Sufi 
values of love, spirituality, and tolerance. The organization, like the state, believes “the 
revitalization of Sufism’s inward-looking religious consciousness [is] an antidote to the coercive 
religious ideology embodied in Wahabism and other extremist strains of Islamic thought” (Feuer, 
2015). The state is also investing money in promoting Sufism through media such as television 
programs (Rddad, 2015). State investment in civil society organizations and media has increased 
the visibility of Sufism. 
 Sufism is also promoted in educational institutions. Scholars are now giving much more 
attention to Sufism and especially its history in Morocco (Rddad, 2015). Further, tariqahs, 
especially the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia, have developed strong presences on university campuses 
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(Rddad, 2015). The leader of the Boutchichia, Sidi Hamza, has shifted the order’s focus from 
tabarruk (seeking spiritual blessings from the sheikh) to tarbiyya (spiritual education) (Bekkaoui 
and Larémont, 2011: 35). To participate in the tariqah it is no longer necessary to go the zawia or 
meet with the sheikh each week for dhikr (ceremonial chant remembering God) but disciples can 
hold dhikr with their friends and peers at a private residence.  
 Another means of promotion has been the hosting of Sufi festivals. Moroccan authorities 
organize festivals to “attract youth to a modernizing Sufi culture. In these events a cocktail of 
musicians, singers, and dancers are invited, from flamenco to Andalusian, rap and gnawa music” 
(Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). Some of the most important festivals are Samaa Festival for 
Spiritual Music in Marrakech, the annual Fez Festival of Sufi Culture, and the Mawlid ceremony 
that commemorates the birth of the Prophet. In 2002, about 15,000 Boutchichia disciples attended 
the Mawlid ceremony but by 2009 it was estimated that 100,000 disciples attended (Bekkaoui and 
Larémont, 2011: 35). Sufi festivals are becoming more popular and engagement with Sufism 
increases along with them.  
 The 2003 Casablanca bombings served as a wake up call to the Moroccan state about how 
the influence of Salafism and extremist Islamic ideologies could lead to violence. In an effort to 
dissociate from Salafism and control the rise of political Islam, the state went about restructuring 
the religious field. The efforts were aimed at better managing mosques, the discourse and 
education of imams, religious media broadcasts, and the issuing of fatwas. To emphasize the 
moderate and tolerant nature of Moroccan Islam, Sufism was adopted as one of its cornerstones. 
Sufism is an effective tool of the state to both counter violent extremism and Islamist opposition 
parties because it promotes “religiosity that encourage interfaith dialogue, universalism, 
tolerance, love, peace, and harmony through a language that is effectively depoliticized” (D. 
Maghraoui, 2009: 206). 
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Youth Perceptions of Sufism 
My Survey and Interview Results 
 Through conducting three in depth interviews and receiving 11 responses to my surveys, 
along with analysis of previous data on this topic, I have been able to form a picture of how 
Sufism is viewed by Moroccan youth. The analysis has led me to conclude that while the 
Moroccan state has heavily promoted Sufism in the public sphere, a majority of youth remain 
minimally engaged with Sufism and are not influenced by it on a daily basis. Instead Sufism 
exists primarily in political and religious discourse at the national level but is not a critical aspect 
of life or religion on the local level.  
 The first question I asked was “do you know any Sufi tariqahs?” Ten of eleven 
individuals surveyed answered “yes” and nine knew the name of at least one tariqah. The most 
identified tariqah was the Tijaniyyah. All those participants who knew the name of a tariqah 
identified the Tijaniyyah. The next most often cited tariqah, with seven participants naming it, 
was the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia. Three participants named the Darqawa tariqah, which is an 
offshoot of the Shadhiliyyah. Finally, two participants named the Basri tariqah. While the vast 
majority of participants in my survey could name Sufi tariqahs active in Morocco, it is important 
to recognize that all but one those surveyed were obtaining a masters degree. On the other hand, 
all the individuals I approached in public places around Rabat such as cafes or Bab al-Had read 
the survey and then gave it back to me saying they did not know anything about Sufism. Within 
the skewed sample of highly educated Moroccans who did complete my survey there is a general 
knowledge of Sufism, but this cannot be generalized to the Moroccan public.  
 The second question asked of participants was “In your opinion, is Sufism important to 
Islam in Morocco?” Six of eleven participants answered “yes” while five answered “no”. The 
reasons for its significance were generally focused on how Sufism is a part of the history of 
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Morocco. One individual answered, “[Sufism] is a part of the Islamic identity like the golden age 
of history in Morocco” (Participant A). Participant B responded that Sufism is “important for its 
role in reviving spirituality.” Hanane Mansour, a student at Dar al-Hadith who I interviewed, also 
believes Sufism is significant historically because it represents the “spirit of ethics in the spiritual 
lives of Muslims” but today in Morocco it is important because the state has adopted it as “a 
pillar and element of Islam in addition to fiq (law) and aqida (doctrine).” Two individuals also 
referred to Sufism as important because it is a moderate form of Islam (Participant C and 
Participant H).  
 Participants who answered “no” believed that Sufism was out-dated. Participant F 
responded, “Sufism served Islam at certain historical stages but in modern times it became a set 
of practices and rituals inconsistent with the values of Islam.” When my host aunt read the survey 
and she laughed at this question and told me bluntly, “Sufism is not important to Muslims in 
Morocco.” From my own data is clear that the significance of Sufism to Islam in Morocco is up 
for debate and there is no definitive answer to if youth perceive Sufism as important in Morocco. 
But both those who do believe Sufism is currently important to Islam and those who don’t agree 
that in the past Sufism was of greater significance.  
 Participants were also asked, “do you participate in a Sufi tariqah?” Ten of eleven 
participants answered “no.” Reasons for not joining were often based on negative perceptions 
such as participant K who answered, “Tariqahs practice outdated rituals.” Participant E said, “I 
am not convinced of the validity of tariqahs so I cannot commit.” An important answer to make 
note of was Participant D who said, “I have not received an invitation from any tariqah.” This 
answer implies that had a tariqah reached out to this individual he might have joined. Tariqahs 
traditionally rely on people seeking them out to become disciples and do not attempt outreach to 
gain members, but the Qadiriyyah Boutchichia has begun to seek out new members especially on 
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college campuses (Rddad, 2015). The participant’s sentiments demonstrate openness to Sufism 
and suggest that engagement with Sufism could increase if tariqahs are more active in recruiting 
disciples. The one participant who does participate in a tariqah explained, “Yes because it is the 
spiritual education I have been looking for since I was younger” (Participant C). From my own 
data it is clear that only a minority of youth join tariqahs.  
 To gauge the participants’ awareness of how the state promotes Sufism, I asked, “Who 
encourages Sufism in Moroccan Society?” Eight participants gave answers related to the state. 
Three of these individuals simply wrote that the Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic 
Affairs promoted Sufism. But the other five gave answers directly stating “the state” or “the 
government” encouraged the presence of Sufism in Moroccan society. Participant F said, “The 
state encourages Sufism and Sufi tariqahs in service of its political goals and to control 
religiosity.” Participant D responded, “The state encourages and advertises Sufism.” Participant 
A stated, “the government and the state promote it as a response to the tendencies of a large part 
of youth.” It is unclear what tendencies he was referencing but it can be surmised that he was 
talking about the engagement of youth with Salafi and jihadi movements. Hanane Mansour 
recognized that the state specifically promotes Sufism to counter religious extremism. Three other 
responses stated that zawias were encouraging Sufism. While it is true that zawias do promote 
Sufism, much of the funding for these organizations is coming from the state. In general, there is 
awareness amongst the participants that Sufism is being actively encouraged within Moroccan 
society. But the education level of the participants is again very significant to how they 
responded. The awareness of the promotion of Sufism cannot be generalized to all youth because 
of the distinct lack of knowledge about Sufism demonstrated by those surveyed at Bab al-Had 
and a café. Individuals asked at those locations refused to participate acknowledging that they did 
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not know the answers to the survey questions. While the educated subsection of individuals I 
researched did recognize the promotion of Sufism, not all youths do.  
 “Moroccan Islam” is a common idiom in the state’s political discourse and the media. In 
media and political discourse “Moroccan Islam” means a form of tolerant, peaceful Islam. It 
refers to the four cornerstones of the Maliki legal tradition, the Ash’ari doctrine, the King as amir 
al-mu’minin, and Sunni Sufism (Rddad). While the term is readily used in speeches by the King 
and his Ministers and can be found in numerous news articles about Morocco’s strategy to 
counter-terrorism, I was interested in understanding if youth also believed in a specific Moroccan 
Islam. I asked participants, “Do you think there is such thing as Morocco Islam?” While not all 
participants answered this question, the majority agreed that there is no such thing as “Moroccan 
Islam.” Most participants agreed that there exists a universal Islam but in individual practices that 
there are differences. Participant A answered, “No because there is one Islam but Morocco, like 
all countries, has its own religiosity.”  Participant E wrote, “There is one Islam with negligible 
differences. The differences are in the customs of people but we are all the same religion.” In her 
interview, Hanane Mansour explained, “Islam is the same in Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia but you 
find the name “Moroccan Islam” in politics to mean a moderate Islam that is open to other 
religions.” Dr. Rddad agreed that in Morocco “Islam is not monolithic. In Morocco we want to 
keep our secular beliefs private. Religion is not a private thing it is communal and public. But, 
there exists a discrepancy between reality and discourses about that reality.” The one participant 
who answered “yes” wrote, “Yes, Islam in Morocco is a mixture of Maliki jurisprudence, the 
Ash’ari doctrine, and Sufism. This mixture cannot be found anywhere besides Morocco.” Indeed 
the four cornerstones of “Moroccan Islam” make it a unique entity. But “Moroccan Islam” only 
exists in discourse. It is the official Islam but my data points to a discrepancy between this 
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discourse and reality. In reality, Moroccan youth don’t see themselves practicing “Moroccan 
Islam” they are simply practicing Islam as a Moroccan.  
Analysis of 2010 Survey on Youth and Sufism 
 In 2010 three researchers, Khalid Bekkaoui, Ricardo René Larémort, and Sadik Rddad, 
conducted a public opinion survey of Moroccan youths’ perceptions and participation in Sufi 
orders. The questions were focused on identity and religious affiliation. The survey involved 
1,054 respondents aged 16-30 (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 2). As of 2010 around 60% of the Moroccan 
population was under the age of 30. The survey and the authors’ analysis conclude that a positive 
statistical shift has occurred in Moroccan youth associating positive values with Sufism 
(Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 1). Through analyzing the 2010 study in addition to my findings, I can 
offer a broader picture of Moroccan youth perceptions and draw more informed conclusions.  
The 2010 questionnaire was in Arabic and was distributed randomly to young Moroccans 
in both rural and urban areas. The sample was 57.40% male and 42.59% female; 73.18% were 
urban respondents while 26.81% were rural (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 2). In terms of education, a 
majority of 69.33% had a university level education. The survey asked participants to define 
themselves in relation to religion, nationality, and ethnicity. 92.69% of those surveyed identified 
as Muslim and 90.03% identified as Moroccan (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 4). The survey shows that 
national and religious identities are very important to Moroccan youth. For comparison, a survey 
done in 1983 found that 70.3% of Moroccan youth identified as Muslim and only 14% identified 
as Moroccan (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 5). The significant increase in self-identification as Muslim 
and as Moroccan points to growing religiosity and nationalism within Moroccan youth.  
The survey then asked questions regarding participation in political parties, religious 
organizations, and Sufi tariqahs. Only 7.68% of participants were affiliated with political parties, 
9.6% with religious organizations, and 8.1% with Sufi tariqahs. Participation in any organized 
Butler-­‐Dines	   24	  
form of religion or politics is low within Moroccan youth. But the study also asked the likelihood 
of respondents to join these groups. In terms of Sufi tariqahs 18.69% responded they were very 
likely to join a tariqah, 18.50% were neither likely nor unlikely to join a tariqah, and 44.68% 
were unlikely to join a tariqah (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 11). The 18.69% who responded very likely 
are important because some respondents may not have been willing to directly express being 
affiliated with a Sufi organization if they were for instance Sufi and a member of the Justice and 
Charity Party, which is suppressed by the state (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 11). The actual percentage 
of youth participating in tariqahs lies, mostly likely, somewhere between the 8.1% who did 
confirm membership in a Sufi tariqah and the 18.69% who were likely to join an order. But this 
is still and small percentage of youth participating in Sufism. 18.69% likely to join a tariqah is 
significantly smaller than the 44.68% who are unlikely to join and echoes my own finding that 
youth engagement with Sufism is very limited.  
The finding of limited engagement with Sufism is demonstrated again the 2010 findings 
on the number of respondents who visit zawias. The majority, 53.79% of participants, never 
attends a zawia. While only 9% frequently go to a zawia (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 12). Only a small 
minority is actively participating in Sufism. However, comparing data from 2005-2006 to the 
2010 data there appears to be an increase in engagement with Sufism. The 2005-2006 survey 
found 0.6% of youth were Sufi disciples and 0.9% were members of zawias (Bekkaoui et al. 
2011: 12). That is a 135% increase in participation in Sufi tariqahs between 2006 and 2010. 
These numbers do mean that while youth engagement in Sufism is limited, it is growing.  
While actual participation in Sufi orders may be low, perceptions of Sufism are more 
positive within youth. Participants were asked if they agree with the state’s adoption of Sufism as 
a cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. In total 40.32% agreed, 32.06% disagreed, and 27.60% had no 
opinion on the decision (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). Significantly more women than men agreed 
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with the decision, 50.11% of females versus 33.05% of males. This discrepancy is related to how 
the political and social scene is dominated by men, but Sufism is an alternative where women 
face less discrimination (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). Significantly more youths positively 
perceived the adoption of Sufism by the state than the percentage of youth who said they were 
likely to join a tariqah. This tendency means that while participation is low, Sufism is not 
necessarily viewed negatively. But when looking at these numbers the majority of participants 
either disagreed or did not have an opinion on the state’s decision. The nearly 60% of respondents 
who did not view the decision positively indicate that despite the state promotion of Sufism 
support for it is still not mainstream.  
The main value associated with Sufism by respondents was spirituality (77.60%) and then 
renunciation of the material world (52.37%) (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 14). 18.12% of respondents 
associated Sufism with progress but 21.82% associated it backwardness. Again 13.28% 
associated Sufism with modernity but 17.83% associated it with obscurantism (Bekkaoui et al. 
2011: 15). Youths thought the elderly were the most likely to join Sufi tariqahs (56.45% of 
respondents) (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 16). These numbers indicate that despite the state’s efforts to 
link Sufism to modernity, this opinion has not become popular. Most importantly though from 
that data is that at least 30% of respondents had no opinion on how Sufism was related to the 
concepts of modernity, progress, backwardness, or obscurantism (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 15). 
There is a significant lack youth opinions on Sufism shown by the 2010 survey. Just as many of 
the people I attempted to survey responded they had no knowledge about Sufism, it appears at 
many of the participants in the 2010 survey also did not know much about Sufism. The lack of 
opinion on the topic of Sufism implies that it is insignificant in the lives of Moroccan youth.  
The 2010 survey did show that Sufism is positively associated with the value of tolerance 
and is linked to protecting youth from religious extremism. 40.79% of respondents agreed that 
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Sufism helps youth avoid joining extremist organizations and another 15.08% believed “more or 
less” that Sufism protected youth from extremism (Bekkaoui et al. 17). A majority of respondents 
(56.54%) associate Sufism with the value of tolerance (Bekkaoui et al. 17). These results signify 
that while only a small minority of youth participates in Sufism, it is viewed positively, especially 
in terms of its message countering religious extremism, by a majority of youth. These are 
favorable results for the state’s promotion of Sufism showing that indeed youth, like the state, 
view Sufism as an alternative to religious fanaticism.  
Analysis 
 An exploration of both my data and the results from the 2010 survey show that youth 
participation in Sufi tariqahs remains low but state has been successful in promoting Sufism as 
an alternative to religious extremism. In my survey, one of eleven respondents (0.09%) was a 
member of a Sufi tariqah. In the 2010 survey 8.1% of participants were members of tariqahs. In 
both cases only a small minority was actively engaging with Sufism. But growth in participation 
has occurred as shown by the results from the 2006 national survey according to which .06% of 
youth were members of tariqahs to 8.1% of youth in 2010. Further, the 18.69% of youth who 
said they were likely to join a tariqah demonstrates the interest in Sufism is growing. The high 
percentage of 2010 respondents who had “no opinion” on many questions and my own 
experience with youths expressing that they knew nothing about Sufism, however, prove that 
Sufism remains outside of mainstream life.  
 The state has put on numerous concerts and festivals aimed combatting the stereotypes of 
Sufism being archaic and anachronistic (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 37). Further they have 
supported outreach by tariqahs on university campuses. Yet, youth engagement with tariqahs 
remains minimal, why? The research points to youth associating Sufism with outdated practices 
and traditions. A higher percentage of 2010 participants associated Sufism with backwardness 
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and obscurantism than with progress and modernity (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 15). From my own 
observations when I discussed my research topic in relaxed conversations with youth I often 
received responses that Sufism is not important or that they didn’t know anything about Sufism. 
But in casual conversations with older generations I observed that nearly every individual had a 
story about a zawia, they may not have personally attended the zawia but it was a place of 
significance in their community.  
Another important reason youth may not being joining tariqahs is because how 
Moroccans acquire religious knowledge has changed. In the past Islam was “transmitted by [to 
youth] by their parents, textbooks, or mosques” (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 8). Going to the zawia was 
an important way of gaining religious knowledge and joining a tariqah was a means of both 
spiritual education and social membership. According to the 2006 national survey, religious 
knowledge is now primarily acquired though television. 68.60% of respondents thought that 
Middle Eastern television channels such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiyya were the most important 
sources of religious knowledge (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 9). Religious institutions are no longer 
primary for spiritual education. Youth now “adhere to an individualized sense of Islam and derive 
their knowledge about faith more from media sources than from mosques” (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 
8). If youth are less inclined to join organized religion or practice Islam in a group setting, then it 
follows that engagement with tariqahs is low.  
Despite low youth participation in tariqahs, Sufism is associated with the values of peace 
and tolerance. A majority of youth agrees Sufism can prevent youth from joining extremist 
organizations (Bekkaoui et al. 2011: 17). The state has promoted Sufism to counter violent 
extremism and youth agree that Sufism is an alternative to Salafism or other extreme ideologies. 
In my research participants expressed that Sufism was important to Islam in Morocco because it 
is a moderate force. One youth agreed that “Sufism with its philosophy of inner peace, social 
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harmony and oneness with God, is seen by many in Morocco as the ideal counterweight to such 
strict interpretations of Islam as Salafism, which have gained ground in the past few decades, as 
well as answering the country’s spiritual needs” (Bekkaoui and Larémont, 2011: 38). The 2010 
survey result of 92.69% of youth identifying as Muslim shows that religion is a very important 
aspect of the lives of Moroccan youths. The worry for the state is that the growing religiosity of 
youth and concurrent interest in finding spiritual guidance will lead youth to join more extreme 
and politically involved religious ideologies. Promoting Sufism, even if youth remain minimally 
engaged, is important because it shows there is an alternative for spiritual involvement based on a 
tolerant and peaceful message.  
Conclusion 
 The 2003 Casablanca bombings led the Moroccan state to adopt Sufism as an official 
cornerstone of Moroccan Islam. Sufism was promoted by appointing Ahmed Toufiq to Minister 
of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, hosting festivals of Sufi culture, financially 
supporting zawias, and encouraging outreach by tariqahs on university campuses. Promoting 
Sufism was important for the state beyond just countering religious extremism, but as a means of 
counteracting the growing influence of Islamist parties and to generate stronger diplomatic 
connections with Western African nations that share Sufi history and traditions with Morocco.  
 The state’s promotion of Sufism has not led to significant growth of youth participating in 
tariqahs. Only a small minority of youth actively engages with tariqahs and the importance of 
Sufism to Islam in Morocco is contested. But in general, youth do view Sufism positively 
associating it with the values of spirituality and tolerance. Engagement with Sufism has grown 
slightly in the years since 2003 and more youth are expressing interest in joining tariqahs. With 
continued outreach on university campuses and through the media, the numbers of Sufi youths 
will probably continue to grow slowly. But Sufism is certainly not a critical aspect of the 
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religious lives of Moroccan youth currently and it is doubtful, especially because of the trend of 
youth being less inclined to join organized religion, that it will become significantly more 
influential in the future.  
Despite these trends the state will likely continue to promote Sufism because it is serves 
its political interests. Sufism may function as an alternate to religious extremism; however, its 
promotion may also be dangerous, especially given how minimal the engagement with it is in 
reality. Promoting Sufism on the basis that it is a moderate, tolerant form of Islam plays in to the 
dichotomy between “good” and “bad” Muslims. These categorizations “rely not on sound 
judgments but, rather, on simple labels based on the way in which people practice their faith. 
Groups that are seen as more political and willing to challenge government policies are 
criticized…However, peaceful Muslims who are Westernized and minimize the role of their own 
faith, and take an impartial view of political affairs, are therefore viewed as good” (Muedini 
2015). Sufism is promoted by the Moroccan state largely because it believed to not challenge the 
status quo, but to assume all Sufis are good and all political Islamist threatening is to make a 
dangerously large and ill-informed assumption. In promoting Sufism, the Moroccan state must be 
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Appendix A – Butler-Dines Survey Results 	   Age	   Education	  level	   Do	  you	  know	  any	  tariqahs?	   Is	  Sufism	  important	  in	  morocco?	   Do	  you	  participate?	   Who	  promotes	  Sufism?	   Is	  there	  such	  thing	  as	  “Moroccan	  Islam?	  A	   	   Masters	   Yes,	  tijania;	  
Qadiriyyah	  
Boutchichia	   Yes,	  it is part of the Islamic identity like the 
golden age in 
the history of 
Morocco 
No,	  I	  don’t	  have	  time	   The	  government	  and	  state	  promote	  it as a 
response to the 
tendencies of a 
large part of 
youth 









but there is 
one Islam in 
reality. B	   	   Masters	  	   Yes,	  Tijania	   Yes,	  it	  is	  important	  for	  its	  role	  in	  reviving	  spirituality	  in	  Morocco	  
No	   The	  zawias	  and	  civil	  organizations	  promote	  it	  
	  
C	   	   Masters	   Yes,	  Tijania;	  
Qadiriyyah	  
Boutchichia	   Yes,	  because it is moderate Islam between 
extremes 
Yes,	  it is the 
spiritual education I 
was looking for 
since I was younger 
Ministry	  of	  endowments	  and	  Islamic	  affairs	  and	  the	  high	  scientific	  council	  
No	  






No	   No,	  I	  have	  not	  received	  an	  invitation	  from	  any	  tariqah.	  	  
The	  state	  encourages	  Sufism	  and	  advertises	  it	  	  
Yes,	  Islam	  in	  morocco	  is	  a	  mixture	  of	  Maliki	  madhhab,	  Ash’ari	  doctrine,	  and	  Sufism.	  This	  is	  a	  mixture	  you	  can’t	  find	  except	  in	  Morocco	  E	   25	   Masters	   Yes:	   No	   No, I am not The	  ministry	  of	   No,	  there	  is	  





convinced on the 
validity of any of 
the tariqahs so I 
can’t commit to one 
endowments	  and	  Islamic	  affairs;	  ministry	  of	  commandment	  	  
one	  islam	  with	  negligible	  differences.	  Differences	  are	  in	  the	  customs	  of	  people	  but	  all	  the	  same	  religion.	  	  F	   30	   High	   Yes:	  tijania,	  
Boutchichia,	   No:	  I	  think	  Sufism	  served	  Islam	  at	  certain	  historical	  stages	  but	  in	  modern	  times	  it	  became	  a set 
of practices and 
rituals 
inconsistent 
with Islam and 
its values 
No	  	   The	  state	  encourages	  Sufism	  and	  Sufi	  tariqahs	  in	  service	  of	  its	  political	  goals	  and	  to	  control	  religion	  
	  







Yes,	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  and	  elements	  of	  Islam	  in	  addition	  to	  fiq	  (law)	  and	  aqida	  (doctrine).	  It	  represents	  the	  spirit	  of	  ethics	  and	  Islam	  in	  the	  spiritual	  life	  of	  Muslims.	  	  
No because I 
believe Sufism is a 
personal experience 
on how to 
understand the 
Qur’an and God 
and evoke meaning 
and values in ones 
like from knowing 
god  
It	  is	  promoted	  by	  the	  government	  as	  an	  element	  of	  Islam	  like	  Maliki	  and	  aqida	  -­‐	  	  
No	  Islam	  is	  the	  same	  in	  Morocco,	  Egypt,	  Tunis,	  but	  you	  find	  the	  name	  “Moroccan	  Islam”	  in	  politics	  to 
mean a 
moderate 
Islam that is 
open to other 
religions  
H 25 Masters	   Yes,	  Tijania	   Yes,	  it	  is	  a	  moderate	  form	  of	  Islam	   No The	  zawias	  	   No	  
I 22 	   No	   No	   No The	  ministry	  of	  Islamic	  affairs	   	  
J  Masters	   Yes,	  
Qadiriya	  
Boutchichia;	  
No	   No The	  state	  encourages	  Sufism	   	  No	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tijania	  
K 25 University	   Yes	  	   Yes	   No, tariqahs practiced outdated 
rituals 
The	  zawias	   No	  
	  	  	  
Appendix	  B	  –	  Survey	  Questions	  in	  English	  	  
1) Do you know any Sufi orders? If yes what are their names? 
2) Do you think Sufism is important to Islam in Morocco? 
3) Have you ever joined a Sufi order? Why or Why not? 
4) Who promotes Sufism in Moroccan society?  
5) Do you think there is such thing as Moroccan Islam? Why or Why not? 
 
Appendix C – Interview Guide 
 
1) What do you know about Sufism? 
2) Do you know any Sufi orders? –  
a. Where and when do you see practices of Sufism in Morocco? 
b. In your opinion are they popular? 
c. Are they viewed positively? 
3) Do you think Sufism is important to Islam in Morocco? 
4) What do you see as the values that Sufism promotes? 
5) Have you ever joined a Sufi order? Why or Why not? 
6) Do you think joining an order is a good/bad thing? Why or why not? 
7) Do you think Morocco would be a better community with more or less Sufism? Why or 
Why not? 
8) Who wants Sufism to be present in Moroccan society?  
9) Do you have any examples of Sufism being promoted in Morocco? 
10) What is the relevance of Sufism in a Muslim life? 
11) Do you think there is such thing as Moroccan Islam? 
 
 
Appendix D – Data from 2010 Bekkaoui, Larémont, and Rddad Survey 
 
Population 2010 in Morocco (pg.2) 33, 483,000 
Male 50.1% 
Female 49.9% 
0-14 years 28.1% 
15-24 years 19.2% 
25-30 years 17.6% 
 
Backgrounds	  of	  respondents	  (pg.	  3)	   	  Urban	  	   73.18%	  Rural	   26.81%	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Male	   57%	  Female	   43%	  No	  education	   2%	  Primary	  School	   1.4%	  Junior	  High	  School	   7.2%	  High	  School	  	   20%	  University	  	   69.33%	  	  	  	  
Moroccan	  Youth	  Self-­‐Identification	  (pg.	  4)	   	  Muslim	   92.69%	  Moroccan	   90.03%	  Arab	   62.71%	  Amazigh	   25.71%	  	  
Youth	  Sources	  for	  Acquiring	  Religious	  
knowledge	  (pg.	  8)	   	  National	  Television	  Channels	   47.9%	  Foreign	  Channels	   22.5%	  Middle	  Eastern	  Religious	  Channels	   68.60%	  Audio	  Cassettes	   15.10%	  Internet	   3.40%	  DVD/VCD	   8.90%	  	  
Youth Membership (pg. 10)  
Political party 7.68% 
Religious Organization 9.6% 
Sufi tariqah  8.1% 
 
Number of youth 





Likely or Very likely 
 
Not likely or unlikely 
 
Unlikely or very 
unlikely 
Political parties 23.90% 25.42% 34.53% 
Religious 
organizations 
45.92% 23.90% 24.38% 




visited zawias (pg. 
12) 
Never Rarely Occasionally Frequently 
 53.79% 23.52% 12% 9% 
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Youth Reaction to 
Moroccan State 














Male 33.05% 37.35% 29.58% 
Female 50.11% 33.85% 16.03% 





















No opinion  
Spirituality 77.60% 10.53% 10.43% 8.44% 
Backwardness 21.82% 11.95% 27.30% 38.50% 
Obscurantism 17.83% 11.19% 34.62% 36.33% 
Progress 18.12% 16.88% 35.19% 29.79% 




40.79% 15.08% 17.45% 26.66% 
Tolerance 56.54% 13.28% 16.12% 9.48% 
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